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Abstract. Password-Authenticated Key Exchange allows users to generate a strong cryptographic key based
on a shared “human-memorable” password without requiring a public-key infrastructure. It is one of the most
widely used and fundamental cryptographic primitives. Unfortunately, mass password theft from organizations
is continually in the news and, even if passwords are salted and hashed, brute force breaking of password
hashing is usually very successful in practice.
In this paper, we propose two efficient protocols where the password database is somehow shared among two
servers (or more), and authentication requires a distributed computation involving the client and the servers.
In this scenario, even if a server compromise is doable, the secret exposure is not valuable to the adversary since
it reveals only a share of the password database and does not permit to brute force guess a password without
further interactions with the parties for each guess. Our protocols rely on smooth projective hash functions and
are proven secure under classical assumption in the standard model (i.e. do not require idealized assumption,
such as random oracles).
Keywords. Password-Authenticated Key Exchange, Distributed Computation, Decision Diffie-Hellman, Smooth
Projective Hashing
1 Introduction
Authenticated Key Exchange protocols enable two parties to establish a shared cryptographically strong
key over an insecure network under the complete control of an adversary. This primitive is one of the
most widely used and fundamental cryptographic primitives and it obviously requires the parties to have
authentication means, e.g. (public or secret) cryptographic keys or short (i.e., low-entropy) secret keys.
PAKE, for Password-Authenticated Key Exchange, allows users to generate a strong cryptographic
key based on a shared “human-memorable” password without requiring a public-key infrastructure. In
this setting, an adversary controlling all communication in the network should not be able to mount an
oﬄine dictionary attack. More precisely, an eavesdropper should not obtain enough information to be
able to brute force guess a password without further interactions with the parties for each guess. Note
that online dictionary attacks in which an adversary simply attempts to log-in repeatedly, trying each
possible low-entropy password can be dealt with using other computer security methods (such as limiting
the number of attempts). In particular, strong security can be obtained even using passwords chosen from
a small set of possible values (a four-digit pin, for example).
Incidents of sensitive customer information ”hacking” (including leaking of passwords) in e-commerce
systems are frequently revealed in the newspaper. In addition to major reputational damage, a com-
pany with a significant data breach may be sued by its clients for the breach and may be suspended or
disqualified from future public sector or government work.
To alleviate the threat that stored passwords are revealed immediately in case of a server compromise,
many servers adopt the approach for storing passwords in a hashed form with a random salt. When the
database of hashed password is compromised, the oﬄine dictionary attack requires a more important
computational effort but remains usually possible. The notion of Verifier-based PAKE, where the client
owns a password pw and the server knows a one-way transformation v of the password only were proposed
by Bellovin and Merritt [BM92]. The two players eventually agree on a common high entropy secret if
and only if pw and v match together. It prevents massive password recovering in case of server corruption
and it forces the attacker who breaks into the server and is willing to recover passwords to perform an
additional costly oﬄine dictionary attack.
We consider an alternative approach inspired by the multi-party computation paradigm (and first
suggested by Ford and Kaliski [FK00]). The password database on the server side is somehow shared
among two servers (or more, but we focus here on two for sake of simplicity), and authentication requires
a distributed computation involving the client – who still does not need an additional cryptographic
device capable of storing high-entropy secret keys – and the two servers who will use some additional
shared secret information. The interaction is performed using a gateway that does not know any secret
information and ends up in the gateway and the client sharing a common key. The lifetime of the protocol
is divided into distinct periods (for simplicity, one may think of these time periods as being of equal length;
e.g. one day) and at the beginning of each period, the two servers interact and update their sharing of the
password database. Similarly to proactive schemes in multi-party computation, we allow the adversary
multiple corruptions of each server, limiting only the corruptions to one server for each period. The user
does not need to update his password nor to perform any kind of computations and its interaction with
the two servers (performed using the gateway) remains the same for the lifetime of the protocol. In this
scenario, even if a server compromise is doable, the secret exposure is not valuable to the adversary since
it reveals only a share of the password database and does not permit to run an oﬄine dictionary attack.
The goal of our paper is to present practical realizations based on classical cryptographic assumptions
in the standard security model.
Related work. EKE (for Encrypted Key Exchange) is the most famous instantiation of Password-
Authenticated Key Exchange. It has been proposed by Bellovin and Merritt [BM92] and simply consists
of a Diffie-Hellman key exchange [DH76], where the flows are symmetrically encrypted under the shared
password.
A first formal security model was proposed by Bellare, Pointcheval and Rogaway [BPR00] (the BPR
model), to deal with oﬄine dictionary attacks. It essentially says that the best attack should be the online
exhaustive search, consisting in trying all the passwords by successive executions of the protocol with the
server. Several variants of EKE with BPR-security proofs have been proposed in the ideal-cipher model
or the random-oracle model (see the survey [Poi12] for details). Katz, Ostrovsky and Yung [KOY01]
proposed the first practical scheme, provably secure in the standard model under the Decision Diffie-
Hellman assumption (DDH). It has been generalized by Gennaro and Lindell [GL03], making use of
smooth projective hash functions.
As mentioned above, Ford and Kaliski [FK00] were the first to propose to distribute the capability
to test passwords over multiple servers. Building on this approach, several such protocols were subse-
quently proposed in various settings (e.g. [Jab01,MSJ02,BJKS03,DG03,DG06,SK05,KMTG05,KMTG12,
ACFP05, KM14]) and it is worth noting that the protocol from [BJKS03] is commercially available as
EMC’s RSA Distributed Credential Protection. Recently, Camenisch, Enderlein and Neven [CEN15] re-
visited this approach and proposed a scheme in the universal composability framework [Can01] (which
has obvious advantages for password-based protocols since users often use related passwords for many
providers). Camenisch et al. gave interesting details about the steps that need to be taken when a com-
promise actually occurs. Unfortunately, due to the inherent difficulties of construction of the simulator in
the universal composability framework, their scheme is inefficient since users and servers have to perform
a few hundred exponentiations each.
Our contributions. In order to achieve practical constructions in the standard security model, we
consider the variant of the BPR model1 in the distributed setting proposed by Katz, MacKenzie, Taban
and Gligor in [KMTG12]. In this security model, we assume that the communication between the client
1 Our schemes can be adapted to achieve security in universal composability framework using techniques similar to those
used in [CEN15]. The resulting schemes are slightly more efficient but are unfortunately still not practical.
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and the authentication servers, is carried on a basically insecure network. Messages can be tapped and
modified by an adversary and the communication between the clients and the servers is asynchronous.
The adversary should not be able to brute force guess a password without further interactions with the
client for each guess even if he corrupts and impersonates a server in an active way.
Our first construction uses a similar approach to the schemes from [Jab01, MSJ02, BJKS03, DG06,
SK05, KMTG12, ACFP05, KM14]: the user generates information theoretic shares of his password and
sends them to the servers. In the authentication phase, the parties run a dedicated protocol to verify
that the provided password equals the priorly shared one. Our solution then consists in some sort of
three-party PAKE, in which (1) the user implicitly checks (using a smooth projective hash function) that
its password is indeed the sum of the shares owned by the two servers, and (2) each server implicitly
checks that its share is the difference of the password owned by the user and the share owned by the
other server. Contrary to the popular approach initiated in [KOY01,GL03] for PAKE, we cannot use two
smooth projective hash functions (one for the client and one for the server) so we propose a technique in
order to combine in a secure way six smooth projective hash functions. This new method (which may be
of independent interest) allows us to prove the security of this construction under classical cryptographic
assumptions (namely the DDH assumption) in the standard security model from [KMTG12] (without any
idealized assumptions).
The main weakness of this first solution is that at each time period, the servers have to refresh the
information-theoretic sharing of the password of all users. This can be handled easily using well-known
techniques from proactive multi-party computation but if the number of users is large, this can be really
time-consuming (in particular if the time period is very short). Our second construction (which is the
main contribution of the paper) is built on the ideas from the first one but passwords are now encrypted
using a public-key encryption scheme where the corresponding secret key is shared among the servers.
At the beginning of each time period, the servers only need to refresh the sharing of this secret key
but the password database is not modified (and can actually be public). Password verification and the
authenticated key exchange is then carried out without ever decrypting the database. A secure protocol
is run to verify that the password sent by the user matches the encrypted password. It is similar to the
protocol we design for the first construction except that the user encrypts its password and the parties
implicitly check (using in this case five smooth projective hash functions) that the message encrypted in
this ciphertext is the same as the message encrypted in the database (using the secret key shared upon
the servers). Both constructions consist in only two flows (one from the client and one from the servers)
and a (private) flow from the servers to the gateway.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we recall various classical definitions, tools used throughout this paper. We use classical
notions and notations and the familiar reader may skip this section.
Public-Key Encryption Scheme. An encryption scheme E is described through four algorithms (Setup,
KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt):
– Setup(1K), where K is the security parameter, generates the global parameters param of the scheme;
– KeyGen(param) outputs a pair of keys, a (public) encryption key ek and a (private) decryption key dk;
– Encrypt(ek,M ; ρ) outputs a ciphertext C, on the message M , under the encryption key ek, with ran-
domness ρ;
– Decrypt(dk, C) outputs the plaintext M , encrypted in the ciphertext C or ⊥.
Such encryption scheme is required to have the classical properties, Correctness and Indistinguisha-
bility under Chosen Plaintext/Ciphertext Attack [GM84]:
– Correctness: For every pair of keys (ek, dk) generated by KeyGen, every messages M , and every random
ρ, we should have Decrypt(dk,Encrypt(ek,M ; ρ)) = M .
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– Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attack [GM84] :
This notion (IND-CPA), formalized by the adjacent game,
states that an adversary shouldn’t be able to efficiently guess
which message has been encrypted even if he chooses the two
original plaintexts.
The advantages are:
AdvindE,A(K) = |Pr[Expind−1E,A (K) = 1]− Pr[Expind−0E,A (K) = 1]|
AdvindE (K, t) = maxA≤t
AdvindE,A(K).
Expind−bE,A (K)
1. param← Setup(1K)
2. (pk, dk)← KeyGen(param)
3. (M0,M1)← A(FIND : pk)
4. c∗ ← Encrypt(ek,Mb)
5. b′ ← A(GUESS : c∗)
6. RETURN b′
One might want to increase the requirements on the security of an encryption, in this case the IND-CPA
notion can be strengthened into Indistinguishability under Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack IND-CCA.
The non-adaptive notion was introduced in [NY90], while the adaptive one was in [RS92]:
– IND-CCA: This notion states that an adversary
should not be able to efficiently guess which mes-
sage has been encrypted even if he chooses the two
original plaintexts, and can ask several decryption
of ciphertexts as long as they are not the challenge
one.
Expind-cca−bE,A (K)
1. param← Setup(1K)
2. (pk, dk)← KeyGen(param)
3. (M0,M1)← A(FIND : pk,ODecrypt(·))
4. c∗ ← Encrypt(ek,Mb)
5. b′ ← A(GUESS : c∗,ODecrypt(·))
6. IF (c∗) ∈ CT RETURN 0
7. ELSE RETURN b′
• Where the ODecrypt oracle outputs the decryption of c under the challenge decryption key dk. The
input queries (c) are added to the list CT of decrypted ciphertexts.
Smooth Projective Hash Functions. Smooth Projective Hash Functions [CS02] were introduced by
Cramer and Shoup. A projective hashing family is a family of hash functions that can be evaluated in two
ways: using the (secret) hashing key, one can compute the function on every point in its domain, whereas
using the (public) projected key one can only compute the function on a special subset of its domain.
Such a family is deemed smooth if the value of the hash function on any point outside the special subset
is independent of the projected key. The notion of SPHF has found applications in various contexts in
cryptography (e.g. [GL03,Kal05,ACP09,BPV12]).
Smooth Projective Hashing System: A Smooth Projective Hash Function over a language L ⊂ X, onto
a set G, is defined by five algorithms (Setup,HashKG,ProjKG,Hash,ProjHash):
– Setup(1K) where K is the security parameter, generates the global parameters param of the scheme,
and the description of an NP language L;
– HashKG(L, param), outputs a hashing key hk for the language L;
– ProjKG(hk, (L, param),W ), derives the projection key hp, possibly depending on the word W [GL03,
ACP09] thanks to the hashing key hk.
– Hash(hk, (L, param),W ), outputs a hash value v ∈ G, thanks to the hashing key hk, and W
– ProjHash(hp, (L, param),W,w), outputs the hash value v′ ∈ G, thanks to the projection key hp and
the witness w that W ∈ L.
In the following, we consider L as a hard-partitioned subset of X, i.e. it is computationally hard to
distinguish a random element in L from a random element in X \L. A Smooth Projective Hash Function
SPHF should satisfy the following properties:
– Correctness: Let W ∈ L and w a witness of this membership. For all hashing keys hk and associated
projection keys hp we have Hash(hk, (L, param),W ) = ProjHash(hp, (L, param),W,w).
– Smoothness: For all W ∈ X \ L the following distributions are statistically indistinguishable:
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∆0 =
(L, param,W, hp, v)
param = Setup(1K),
hk = HashKG(L, param),
hp = ProjKG(hk, (L, param),W ),
v = Hash(hk, (L, param),W )

∆1 =
(L, param,W, hp, v)
param = Setup(1K),
hk = HashKG(L, param),
hp = ProjKG(hk, (L, param),W ),
v
$← G
 .
– Pseudo-Randomness: If W ∈ L, then without a witness of membership the two previous distributions
should remain computationally indistinguishable.
Classical Instantiations. For our needs, we consider discrete-logarithm based encryption schemes and
related smooth projective hash functions. The underlying setting is a group G (denoted multiplicatively)
of prime order p and we denote g a random generator of G = 〈g〉. The security of our constructions will
rely on the standard Decisional Diffie Hellman problems in G:
Decisional Diffie Hellman (DDH) [Bon98]: The Decisional Diffie-Hellman hypothesis states that in a group
(p,G, g) (written in multiplicative notation), given (gµ, gν , gψ) for unknown µ, ν $← Zp, it is hard to decide
whether ψ = µν.
ElGamal encryption [ElG84] is defined by the following four algorithms:
– Setup(1K): The scheme needs a multiplicative group (p,G, g). The global parameters param consist of
these elements (p,G, g).
– KeyGen(param): Chooses one random scalar α
$← Zp, which define the secret key dk = α, and the
public key pk = h = gα.
– Encrypt(pk = h,M ; r): For a message M ∈ G and a random scalar r $← Zp, computes the ciphertext
as C =
(
c1 = h
rM, c2 = g
r
)
.
– Decrypt(dk = α,C = (c1, c2)): One computes M = c1/(c
α
2 ).
As shown by Boneh [Bon98], this scheme is IND-CPA under the hardness of DDH.
Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [CS98] is an IND-CCA version of the ElGamal Encryption.
– Setup(1K) generates a group G of order p, with a generator g
– KeyGen(param) generates (g1, g2)
$← G2, dk = (x1, x2, y1, y2, z) $← Z5p, and sets, c = gx11 gx22 , d = gy11 gy22 ,
and h = gz1 . It also chooses a Collision-Resistant hash function HK in a hash family H (or simply a
Universal One-Way Hash Function). The encryption key is ek = (g1, g2, c, d, h,HK).
– Encrypt(ek,M ; r), for a message M ∈ G and a random scalar r ∈ Zp, the ciphertext is C = (u =
(gr1, g
r
2), e = M · hr, v = (cdξ)r), where v is computed afterwards with ξ = HK(u, e).
– Decrypt(`, dk, C): one first computes ξ = HK(u, e) and checks whether u
x1+ξy1
1 · ux2+ξy22 ?= v. If the
equality holds, one computes M = e/(uz1) and outputs M . Otherwise, one outputs ⊥.
The security of the scheme is proven under the DDH assumption and the fact the hash function used
is a Universal One-Way Hash Function (see [CS98]for details).
3 Security Model
Distributed PAKE. In a distributed PAKE system, we consider as usual a client (owning a password)
willing to interact with a gateway, such as a website. The difference compared to a non-distributed system
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is that the gateway itself interacts with two servers, and none of the three owns enough information to
be able to recover the passwords of the clients on its own2. Such a scheme is correct if the interaction
between a client with a correct password and the gateway succeeds. An honest execution of a distributed
PAKE protocol should result in the client holding a session key KU and the gateway holding a session
key KG = KU.
We propose in this paper two settings that describe well this situation. In a first setting, we consider
that the passwords of the clients are shared information-theoretically between the servers, such as pi =
pi1 + pi2 (if the password pi belongs to an appropriate group) or with the help of any secret sharing
protocol. At the beginning of each time period, the shares are updated, in a probabilistic way, using a
public function Refresh, depending on the sharing protocol used.
In a second setting, we consider that the gateway owns a database of encrypted passwords (which
can be considered public), and the servers each own a share of the corresponding private keys (obtained
by a secret sharing protocol). Again, at the beginning of each time period, the shares are updated, in a
probabilistic way, using a public function Refresh, depending on the sharing protocol used.
Since the security of our schemes is not analyzed in the universal composability framework (contrary
to the recent paper [CEN15]), the Refresh procedure can be handled easily using classical techniques
from computational proactive secret sharing (see [OY91,HJKY95] for instance).
Security Model. We consider the classical model [BPR00] for authenticated key-exchange, adapted to
the two-server setting by [ACFP05,KMTG12]. In the latter model, the authors assume that every client
in the system shares its password with exactly two servers. We loosen this requirement here, depending on
the setting considered, as described above. We refer the interested reader to these articles for the details
and we give the high-level ideas in the Appendix A.
4 Our Simple Protocol
In this first setting, we consider a client U owning a password pi and willing to interact with a gateway G.
The gateway interacts with two servers S1 (owning pi1) and S2 (owning pi2), such that pi = pi1 + pi2. It
should be noted that only the client’s password is assumed to be small and human-memorable. The two
“passwords” owned by the servers can be arbitrarily big. The aim of the protocol is to establish a shared
session key between the client and the gateway.
A simple solution to this problem consists in considering some sort of three-party PAKE, in which the
client implicitly checks (using an SPHF) whether its password is the sum of the shares owned by the two
servers, and the servers implicitly check (also using an SPHF) whether their share is the difference of the
password owned by the client and the share owned by the other server. For sake of simplicity, we denote
the client U as S0 and its password pi as pi0.
4.1 Building Blocks
Cramer-Shoup encryption and SPHF. We consider Cramer-Shoup encryption as described in Section 2.
The public key is denoted by ek = (g1, g2, c, d, h,HK) and the private key by dk = (x1, x2, y1, y2, z)
$← Z5p.
The public parameters (G, p, g, ek) are given as a common reference string.
We denote the ciphertext of a message M ∈ G with the scalar r ∈ Zp by C = CSek(M ; r) = (u1, u2, e, v),
with v = cdξ and ξ = HK(u1, u2, e).
We use the SPHF described in [BBC+13] for the language of the valid ciphertexts of M under the
public key ek. Its main advantage is that it can be computed without using the associated ciphertext,
and in particular before having seen it. This allows all the participants to send their ciphertext and their
projected keys in only one flow. The classical use of this SPHF is as follows: user U (owning a message M)
2 Note that the gateway can be merged with one server.
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and V (owning a message M ′) are supposed to share a common message, so that M = M ′. User U wants
to implicitly check this equality. To this aim, user V sends an encryption C of M ′ under randomness r. In
order for U to implicitly check that C is a valid encryption of M , it chooses a hash key hk and computes
and sends a projection key hp to V . If M = M ′ and if the encryption was computed correctly, then
the hash value H computed by U using the private value hk is the same as the projected hash value H ′
computed by V using the public value hp and its private witness r. The SPHF is described by the following
algorithms.
Setup(1K): param = (ek,M)
L = {C = (u1, u2, e, v) ∈ G4 | ∃r ∈ Zp such that
C = CSek(M ; r)}
HashKG(L, (ek,M)): hk = (η, γ, θ, λ, κ) $← Z5p
ProjKG(hk, (L, (ek,M))): hp = (hp1 = gη1gθ2hλcκ, hp2 = gγ1dκ) ∈ G2
Hash(hk, (L, (ek,M)), C): H = Hash(hk, (ek,M), C) = u(η+ξγ)1 uθ2(e/M)λvκ
ProjHash(hp, (L, (ek,M ′)), C, r): H ′ = (hp1hpξ2)r
It has been known to be correct, smooth and pseudo-random since [BBC+13].
Main Idea of the Construction. In our setting, we denote by pwb = g
pib . The main idea of the protocol is
depicted on Figure 1. For sake of readability, the participants which have a real role in the computations
are directly linked by arrows in the picture, but one should keep in mind that all the participants (U, S1
and S2) only communicate with G, which then broadcasts all the messages.
In a classical SPHF-based two-party key-exchange between U and G, the client and the gateway would
compute a Cramer-Shoup encryption of their password: C0 = CSek(pw0; r0) and CG = CSek(pwG; rG). The
gateway would then send a projection key hpG,0 in order to implicitly check via an SPHF whether C0 is
a valid Cramer-Shoup encryption of pwG, and the client would send a projection key hp0,G in order to
implicitly check via an SPHF whether CG is a valid Cramer-Shoup encryption of pw0.
Here, since S0 owns pw0 = pw1 · pw2, so that the players do not share the same password, we
consider an SPHF between each pair of players (Si,Sj), in which player Si computes the ciphertext
Ci = CSek(pwi; ri), the keys hki,j and hpi,j and sends (Ci, hpi,j) to Sj . It also computes the hash value
Hi,j = Hash(hki,j , (ek, pwi), Cj) and projected hash value H ′j,i = ProjHash(hpj,i, (ek,Mi), Ci, ri). Formally,
for each pair of users (Si,Sj), the language checked on Sj by Si is defined as follows: Cj ∈ Li,j = {C =
(u1, u2, e, v) ∈ G4 | ∃r ∈ Zp such that C = CSek(pwj ; r)} but it cannot be checked directly by a unique
SPHF since the passwords are different (and thus Si does not know pwj). Rather, we combine in the
protocol the six SPHF described to globally ensure the correctness (each one remaining smooth and
pseudo-random), as described in the next part. The correctness of the SPHF for the pair (Si,Sj) im-
plies that if everything was computed honestly, then one gets the equalities Hi,j(pwi/pwj)
λi = H ′i,j and
Hj,i(pwj/pwi)
λj = H ′j,i.
4.2 Login procedure
– Each participant Sb picks rb at random and computes a Cramer-Shoup encryption of its password
Cb = CSek(pwb; rb), with vb = cdξb .
It also chooses, for i ∈ {0, 1, 2} \ {b}, a random hash key hkb,i = (ηb,i, γb,i, θb,i, λb, κb,i) and sets hpb,i =
(hpb,i;1, hpb,i;2) = (g1
ηb,ig2
θb,ihλbcκb,i , g1
γb,idκb,i) as the projection key intended to the participant Si.
It sends (Cb, (hpb,i)i∈{0,1,2}\{b}) to the gateway G, which broadcasts these values to the other partici-
pants.
– After receiving the first flow from the servers, the client computes H ′i,0 = hpi,0;1
r0hpi,0:2
ξ0r0 for i ∈
{1, 2}. It also computes H0 = H0,1·H0,2·pw0λ0 , and sets its session key KU as KU = K0 = H ′1,0·H ′2,0·H0.
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UC0 = CSek(pw0; r0)
G
S1
C1 = CSek(pw1; r1)
S2
C2 = CSek(pw2; r2)
hp1,2
(r2 for C2
known?)
hp2,1
(r1 for C1
known?)
hp1,0 (r0 for C0 known?)
hp0,1 (r1 for C1 known?)
hp2,0 (r0 for C0 known?)
hp0,2 (r2 for C2 known?)
Fig. 1. Main idea of the construction
After receiving the first flow from the other server and the client, the server Sb computes, for i ∈
{0, 3 − b}, H ′i,b = hpi,b;1rbhpi,b;2ξbrb . It also computes Hb = Hb,0/(Hb,3−b · pwλbb ), and sets its partial
key Kb as Kb = H
′
0,b ·H ′3−b,b ·Hb. It privately sends this value Kb to the gateway G.
– The gateway finally sets KG = K1 ·K2.
Correctness. Recall that H ′i,j = Hi,j(pwi/pwj)
λi for all pairs (i, j) ∈ {0, 1, 2}2, so that the session key of
the gateway is equal to KG = K1 ·K2, i.e.
KG =
H′0,1H
′
2,1H1,0
H1,2pw
λ1
1
H′0,2H
′
1,2H2,0
H2,1pw
λ2
2
= H0,1H1,0H0,2H2,0
(
1
pw2
)λ1 (
1
pw1
)λ2 ( (pw0)2
pw1pw2
)λ0
while the session key of the client is KU = H
′
1,0 ·H ′2,0 ·H0, i.e.
KU = H
′
1,0 ·H ′2,0 ·H0,1 ·H0,2 · pw0λ0 = H0,1H1,0H0,2H2,0
(
pw1
pw0
)λ1 (pw2
pw0
)λ2
(pw0)
λ0
and these two values are equal as soon as pw0 = pw1 · pw2.
Complexity. The following table sums up the number of group elements needed for each participant. It
should be noted that in case one of the servers is the gateway, its communication costs are reduced.
Ciphertext
(Broadcast)
Projection
Keys (Overall)
To the Gateway
Client 4 4 0
Server (each) 4 4 1
Proof of Security. The proof follows the spirit of the proofs given in [KV11,BBC+13]. For lack of space,
a sketch is given in the Appendix B.
5 Our Efficient Protocol
In this second setting, we consider again a client U owning a password pi and willing to interact with
a gateway G. The gateway owns a public database of encrypted passwords, and it interacts with two
servers S1 and S2, each owning a share of the secret key of the encryption scheme. The aim of the protocol
is to establish a shared session key between the client and the gateway.
The idea is similar to the protocol described in the former section, except that only the client needs to
compute a ciphertext, the other ciphertext being publicly available from the database. The participants
implicitly check (using several SPHF) that the message encrypted in the ciphertext of the client is the
same as the message encrypted in the database (using the secret key shared upon the servers).
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5.1 Building Blocks
Cramer-Shoup encryption and SPHF. We consider Cramer-Shoup encryption as described in Section 2.
The public key is denoted by ek = (g1, g2, c, d, h,HK) and the private key by dk = (x1, x2, y1, y2, z)
$← Z5p.
The public parameters (G, p, g, ek) are given as a common reference string.
We denote the ciphertext of a message M ∈ G with the scalar r ∈ Zp by C = CSek(M ; r) = (u1, u2, e, v),
with v = cdξ and ξ = HK(u1, u2, e).
We use here the simpler SPHF described in [GL03] for the language of the valid ciphertexts of M under
the public key ek, in which the participants need to see the ciphertext before being able to compute their
projection keys. Since only the servers will be required to compute such projection keys and since they are
not required to compute a ciphertext anymore, all the participants will be able to do all their computation
in only one round as in the former protocol. The SPHF is described by the following algorithms.
Setup(1K): param = (ek,M)
L = {C = (u1, u2, e, v) ∈ G4 | ∃r ∈ Zp such that
C = CSek(M ; r)}
HashKG(L, (ek,M)): hk = (η, θ, λ, κ) $← Z4p
ProjKG(hk, (L, (ek,M)), C): hp = gη1gθ2hλ(cdξ)κ ∈ G
Hash(hk, (L, (ek,M)), C): H = uη1uθ2(e/M)λvκ
ProjHash(hp, (L, (ek,M ′)), C, r): H ′ = hpr
It has been known to be correct, smooth and pseudo-random since [GL03].
El Gamal encryption and SPHF. We consider El Gamal encryption as described in Section 2. The public
key is denoted by pk = h = gα and the private key by sk = α
$← Zp. The public parameters (G, p, g, pk) are
given as a common reference string. We denote the ciphertext of a message M ∈ G with the scalar r ∈ Zp
by C = EGpk(M ; r) = (e, u) = (hrM, gr).
The regular SPHF used throughout the literature [CS02] on the language {C = (e, u) ∈ G2 | ∃r ∈
Zp such that C = EGpk(M ; r)} of the valid encryptions of M , with r being the witness of the word C,
usually allows a server to check whether the ciphertext was honestly computed on the value M by a
client, by generating a pair of keys (hk, hp) and sending hp to the client.
Here, on the contrary, we now want a client to implicitly check that a server knows the decryption key
of the encryption scheme. This means that the client computes both the ciphertext (or the ciphertext is
publicly available in a database, as here) and the pair of keys (hk, hp) and sends the ciphertext as well as
hp to the server, which now uses the decryption key as a witness. This implies the following modifications
to the algorithms of the SPHF:
Setup(1K): param = (pk,M)
L = {C = (e, u) ∈ G2 | ∃α ∈ Zp such that
h = gα and e/uα = M}
HashKG(L, (pk,M)): hk = (λ, µ) $← Z2p
ProjKG(hk, (L, (pk,M)), C): hp = uλgµ ∈ G
Hash(hk, (L, (pk,M)), C): H = hµ(e/M)λ
ProjHash(hp, (L, (pk,M ′)), C, α): H ′ = hpα
and we show that this SPHF satisfies the usual properties:
– Correctness: if C ∈ L with witness α, one directly gets H = H ′;
– Smoothness: assume C /∈ L. It can then be parsed as C = (e, u) with u = gr and e = hrM ′ = gαrMgδM
(with M ′ 6= M and thus δM 6= 0), so that hp = uλgµ = grλ+µ and H = hµ(e/M)λ = gαµg(αr+δM )λ.
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The smoothness is then easy to see by considering the following equality of matrices:(
logg(hp)
logg(H)
)
=
(
r 1
αr + δM α
)
·
(
λ
µ
)
which shows that as soon as the word is not a valid encryption of M , and so δM is not equal to 0, the
Hash value H is not in the span of the projection key hp so that the two distributions described in
Section 2 are indistinguishable.
– Pseudo-Randomness. Since El Gamal encryption is IND-CPA, it is impossible to distinguish between a
real encryption and a random value without knowing the decryption key. Since the decryption key is
the witness of the SPHF, without knowing the witness, the two distributions remain indistinguishable.
Main Idea of the Construction. Again, we denote the client U as S0 and its password pi as pi0. In our setting,
we denote by pwk = g
pik for all k. The database contains El Gamal encryptions of each ciphertext pwUi ,
under randomness sUi : CdbUi = EGpk(pwUi ; sUi) = (hsUipwUi , gsUi ), so that here, CdbU = EGpk(pwU; sU) =
(hsUpwU, g
sU). The client computes a Cramer-Shoup encryption of its password: C0 = CSek(pw0; r0) =
(u1, u2, e, v) with v = cd
ξ. The execution of the protocol should succeed if these encryptions are correct
and pw0 = pwU. Recall that the server Si knows αi such that α = α1 +α2 is the decryption key of the El
Gamal encryption.
The main idea is depicted on Figure 2. For sake of readability, the participants which have a real role
in the computations are directly linked by arrows in the picture, but one should keep in mind that all the
participants (U, S1 and S2) only communicate with G, which then broadcasts all the messages.
In a classical SPHF-based two-party key-exchange between U and G, the gateway would check if C0
is a valid Cramer-Shoup encryption of pwU. Since here the password pwU is unknown to the servers S1
and S2, this is done in our setting by two SPHF, using hp
CS
1 (sent by S1) and hp
CS
2 (sent by S2), where
the servers use the first term of the public encryption CDBU (hsUpwU) in order to cancel the unknown pwU.
In a classical SPHF-based two-party key-exchange between U and G, the client would also check whether
CDBU is a valid El Gamal encryption of its password pw0, i.e. whether the gateway knows a witness for its
ciphertext CDBU (sU in the usual constructions, α here). Since α is unknown to the gateway, this is done
in our setting by the combination of three SPHF, using hpEG0 (sent by the client), hp
EG
1 (sent by S1) and
hpEG2 (sent by S2). These three SPHF allow the client and the servers to implicitly check that the servers
know α1 and α2 such that CDBU can be decrypted (using the decryption key α = α1 + α2) to the same
password pw0 than the one encrypted in C0 sent by the client. Formally, the languages checked are as
follows:
– by the client:
CDBU ∈ L0 = {C = (e, u) ∈ G2 | ∃α ∈ Zp such that h = gα and e/uα = pw0}
– by server Si (with respect to the client S0 and server Sj):
C0 ∈ Li,0 = {C = (u1, u2, e, v) ∈ G4 | ∃r ∈ Zp such that C = CSek(pwU; r) and CDBU ∈ Li,j = {C =
(e, u) ∈ G2 | ∃αj ∈ Zp such that h = gαi+αj} and e/uαi+αj = pwU}
but they cannot be checked directly by a unique SPHF since the value pwU appearing in the languages
is unknown to the verifier Si. Rather, the server Si will use the first term of the public encryption CDBU
(hsUpwU) in order to cancel this unknown pwU. To achieve this goal, we combine the five SPHF described
to globally ensure the correctness (each one remaining smooth and pseudo-randomness), as described in
the next part.
5.2 Login procedure
– The client U = S0 chooses r0 at random and computes a Cramer-Shoup encryption of its password
C0 = CSek(pw0; r0) = (u1, u2, e, v) with v = cdξ.
It also chooses a random (El Gamal) hash key hkEG0 = (λ0, µ0) and computes the corresponding
projected key on the ciphertext CDBU = EGpk(pwU; sU) = (hsUpwU, gsU) contained in the database:
hpEG0 = g
sUλ0gµ0 .
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UC0 = CSek(pw0; r0)
G
CDBU = EGpk(pwU; sU)
sk = α1 + α2 (unknown)
S1
α1
S2
α2
hpEG0 (α for CDBU known?) hp
EG
1
(α2 for CDBU
known?)
hpEG2
(α1 for CDBU
known?)
hpCS1 (r0 for C0 known?)
hpCS2 (r0 for C0 known?)
Fig. 2. Main idea of the construction
It sends (C0, hpEG0 ) to the gateway, which broadcasts these values to the servers.
– After receiving this flow from the client, the servers S1 and S2 also choose a random (El Gamal) hash
key hkEGb = (λb, µb) and compute the corresponding projected key on the ciphertext CDBU contained in
the database: hpEGb = g
sUλbgµb .
The servers S1 and S2 also choose a random (Cramer-Shoup) hash key hk
CS
b = (ηb, θb, λb, κb) (with the
same value λb) and compute the corresponding projected key on the ciphertext C0 sent by the client:
hpCSb = (g1
ηbg2
θbhλb(cdξ)κb).
Each server sends (hpEGb , hp
CS
b ) to the gateway G, which broadcasts these values to the other partici-
pants.
– After receiving the projected keys from the servers, the client computes, for i ∈ {1, 2}, H ′i,0 = (hpCSi )r0 .
It also computes H0 = (h
sUpwU/pw0)
λ0hµ0 by dividing the first term of the ciphertext CDBU contained
in the database by its password pw0. It finally sets its session key KU as KU = K0 = H
′
1,0 ·H ′2,0 ·H0.
After receiving the first flow from the other server and the client, the server Sb computes, for i ∈
{0, 3− b}, H ′i,b = (hpEGi )αb .
It also computes Hb,0 = (u1)
ηb(u2)
θb [e/(hsUpwU)]
λbvκb and Hb = Hb,0 · (hpEGb )αb/hµb , and sets its
partial key Kb as Kb = H
′
0,b ·H ′3−b,b ·Hb. It privately sends this value Kb to the gateway G.
– The gateway finally sets KG = K1 ·K2.
Correctness. Due to the correctness of the Cramer-Shoup SPHF, we have H ′b,0 = Hb,0
(
hsUpwU
pw0
)λb
for
b ∈ {1, 2}. The session key of the gateway is thus equal to KG = K1 ·K2 = (H ′0,1 ·H ′2,1 ·H1)·(H ′0,2 ·H ′1,2 ·H2)
where, after computation, Kb = h
(λ0+λ1+λ2)αbg(µ0+µ1+µ2)αbH ′b,0(pw0/pwU)
λbh−sUλbh−µb .
If pw0 = pwU, h = g
α and α = α1 + α2, KG = h
sUλ0hµ0H ′1,0H ′2,0, which is equal to the session key of the
client KU = K0 = H
′
1,0 ·H ′2,0 ·H0 = H ′1,0 ·H ′2,0 · hsUλ0hµ0 .
Complexity. The following table sums up the number of group elements needed for each participant. It
should be noted that in case one of the servers is the gateway, its communication costs are reduced.
Ciphertext
(Broadcast)
Projection
Keys
(Overall)
To the Gateway
Client 4 2 0
Server (each) 0 2 1
Compared to [KMTG12], the communication complexity of our protocol is decreased by more than
50% (9 group elements instead of 20 group elements). For efficiency, as in [KMTG12], we count exponen-
tiations only, and assume a multi-exponentiation with up to 5 bases can be computed at the cost of at
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most 1.5 exponentiations. The client performs the equivalent of 8 full exponentiations, while each server
performs 7 exponentiations (instead of 15 and 13 respectively in [KMTG12]).
Proof of Security. The proof follows the idea of the former one. For lack of space, a sketch is given in the
Appendix B.
6 Conclusion
We presented two constructions of distributed Password-Authenticated Key Exchange between a user and
several servers. We focused on presenting them in a classical group setting (with only two servers). Very
efficient implementations of our protocols can be readily obtained using standard cryptographic libraries
and do not require pairings.
Our methods can be generalized to the setting where n servers share the (encryption of the) password.
SPHF can further handle polynomials of variables and the use of secret sharing techniques a` la Shamir,
allows to share polynomials evaluation between n servers and to provide a threshold distributed PAKE
such that security is ensured as long as less than a certain arbitrary threshold t ∈ {1, . . . , n} of servers are
compromised (contrary to the protocol from [DG06] which requires an honest majority of the servers).
Smooth projective hashing is mostly used in a classical discrete-logarithm-based setting (or pairing-
based setting) but constructions were also proposed for Paillier encryption [CS02] and for LWE encryp-
tion [KV09]. These SPHF would allow a readily adaptation of our techniques to other classical settings of
cryptography.
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A Security Model
As in [KMTG12], we consider an adversarial model in which the attacker is active and can play on behalf
of a user, or corrupt a server, or play on behalf of the gateway (to perform an online dictionary attack).
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We assume the existence of a timestamp, only allowing the adversary to corrupt one server once during
each time period, which means that the client interacts with at most one corrupted server. We also assume
that the gateway is the only entity which directly communicates with the client: messages to and from
the servers and the client are all transmitted by the gateway. Similarly, we assume there is no direct
communication between the servers. For the sake of efficiency, the gateway may sometimes be merged
with one of the servers. As in [ACFP05], we assume the existence of a private channel between the gateway
and the servers, only used for the final computation of the session key of the gateway (we only need the
secret communication to be possible from the servers to the gateway).
Each participant is assumed to be able to execute the protocol many times, possibly concurrently,
which is modeled by allowing it to have an unlimited number of instances (used only once). Each instance
maintains a local state during the execution of the protocol and is associated with several variables: its
session identifier (i.e. its identity), its partner identifier (i.e. the identity of the participants with whom
it believes to be interacting), its session key and two boolean variables useful to indicate whether the
instance has terminated and/or accepted. Terminated means that the instance has finished sending and
receiving messages according to the description of the protocol whereas in our case, accepted means that
the instance believes it has established a session key with its partner.
The session identifier of an instance is defined as the ordered sequence of incoming and outgoing
messages for this instance sent through the gateway. This is clear from the oracle queries made by the
adversary. Instances of client and servers are called partners if session identifiers are equal (they share
the same transcript of execution) and the identity of each is included into the partner identifier of the
other. Since the gateway does not formally participate in the computation, an instance j of the servers S1
and S2 implicitly defines an instance j of the gateway.
The adversary is assumed to have complete control over the public communication between the par-
ticipants and the gateway. This is formally modeled by letting him have access to the instances via the
following oracles. Note that the adversary also receives the internal state of any corrupted participant.
Furthermore, since we consider active corruptions, he also controls all messages sent by corrupted partic-
ipants.
– Send(U, i,m): this sends message m to the gateway, which then forwards it appropriately to the
ith instance of the client U, which behaves in response as described in the protocol. Its output is given
to the adversary.
– Send(G, j,m): this sends message m to the gateway, which then forwards it appropriately to the
jth instance of the servers S1 and S2, which behave in response as described in the protocol. Their
output is given to the adversary.
– Execute(U, i,G, j): this oracle executes the protocol between the ith instance of the client C and the
jth instance of the servers S1 and S2 (via the gateway) and outputs the transcript of the execution
(i.e. all the public communication) to the adversary.
– Reveal(U, i,G, j): this outputs the session key hold by the ith instance of the client U in an execution
with the jth instance of the servers S1 and S2 (assuming these participants are partners). This models
possible leakage of the key for several reasons such as misuse, compromise of a computer, etc. Similarly,
Reveal(G, j,U, i) outputs the session key hold by the gateway G in an execution between the ith instance
of the client U and the jth instance of the servers S1 and S2 (assuming these participants are partners).
– Test(U, i,G, j): this is the query needed in order to properly define the security of the protocol. As-
suming the ith instance of the client U and the jth instance of the servers S1 and S2 are partners, the
oracle outputs ⊥ if the session key of the ith instance of the client C computed during an execution
with the jth instance of the servers has not yet been set. Otherwise, it generates a random bit b: if
b = 1, the real session key is given to the adversary, whereas if b = 0, a random session key is given
a random session key. The query Test(G, j,U, i) on the session key computed by the gateway G in an
execution between the ith instance of the client U and the jth instance of the servers S1 and S2 is
defined the same way. The adversary is allowed a single Test query at any time during the execution
of the protocol.
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The correctness of an execution of the protocol is defined as follows: if the ith instance of the client U
and the jth instance of the servers S1 and S2 are partners and they have all terminated and accepted,
then the ith instance of the client and the jth instance of the gateway conclude with the same session key.
A session key is said fresh if none of the participants is corrupted, the adversary never asked a Reveal
query for the particular instance of either the client or the gateway. We say that the adversary succeeds
(event Succ) if he asks a single query Test(U, i,G, j) or Test(G, j,U, i) on a fresh key skiU,G or sk
j
G,U and
outputs a single bit b′ such as b′ is equal to the bit b chosen by the Test oracle. His advantage against the
protocol pi is then defined as AdvA(pi) = 2Pr(Succ) − 1, the probability being taken over all the random
coins used by the adversary and the participants during the execution of the protocol.
The number of on-line attacks are counted by the number of Send queries corresponding to this
execution of the protocol. (The Execute queries are not counted in the on-line attacks.)
Definition 1. A protocol pi is said to be a secure two-server password-authenticated key-exchange if there
exists a constant c such that, for all dictionary sizes N and all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries
making at most qs on-line attacks and corrupting at most one server partnered with a client, AdvA(pi) ≤
cqs
N + ε(k), where k is the security parameter and ε a negligible function.
Here, c = 1 in our security proofs, which means that the adversary can try one password by execution,
i.e. on-line dictionary attack (the authors of [KMTG12] only achieve c = 2 with their protocol).
B Sketch of Proofs
B.1 Simple Protocol
The proof follows the spirit of the proof given in [KV11, BBC+13]. Recall that at most one server is
corrupted during the execution of the protocol (meaning that the adversary cannot trivially recover the
password of the client) and all the communication goes through the gateway so that the client apparently
interacts with a unique server (it receives a unique message from the gateway (concatenation of the
messages sent by the servers) even if it sends messages destined to a set of two servers). One can thus
see that the security of our distributed password-authenticated key-exchange, constructed as some sort
of three-party PAKE, can be reduced to that of the PAKE proven in the BPR model in [BBC+13]. More
precisely, its security can be proven through the following games:
– Game0: this is the real game, where the adversary has a certain advantage (that we are willing to
upper-bound) to win.
– Game1: we modify the way Execute-queries are answered, by replacing the ciphertexts Ci by correct
encryptions of a random password p˜w, so that Ci is not in Lj,i anymore, for j 6= i. This is indistin-
guishable under the IND-CPA property of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme.
– Game2: we modify the way Execute-queries are answered, by replacing the common session key by
a random value. Since the languages are not satisfied from the former game, the smoothness ensures
the indistinguishability from the former game.
– Game3: we modify the way Send1-queries (when the adversary sent a flow and waits for the answer) are
answered, by using a decryption oracle or alternatively knowing the decryption key. If the ciphertext
has been generated by the adversary who used the good password, one declares that A succeeds and
terminates the game (event Bad happens). If it is not correct or consistent with the other participant’s
value, one chooses the session key at random. If it is a replay of a previous flow sent by the simulator,
one knows the hashing keys and can compute the session keys using them. The advantage of the
adversary only increases if event Bad happens, which probability is computed later on.
– Game4: we modify again the way Send1-queries are answered: if the message was already received by
a partner of the user, we set the key identical to the key set for this user. Otherwise, the key is set
at random. The first case is identical to the previous game since the message is a replay of a previous
flow, and the second case is indistinguishable thanks to the technical lemma proven in [KV11].
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– Game5: we now modify the way Send0-queries (when the adversary asks a user for a first flow) are
answered: as in Game1, one encrypts a random value pw. Since decryptions are now required (to
answer Send1-queries from Game3), this game is indistinguishable under the IND-CCA property of the
Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme.
– Game6: since the hashing and projection keys only depend on public values given in the common
reference string, the private values of the honest players are not used anymore in this final game,
except for checking whether the adversary has won (event Bad). They can thus be chosen at random,
at the very end of the execution, only to check if this event happened. The advantage of the adversary
in this last game is thus exactly the probability of this event, which is bounded by qs/N , with qs being
the number of Send-queries (i.e. on-line dictionary attacks) and N the size of the dictionary.
B.2 Efficient Protocol
The proof is conducted exactly as in the former protocol, even simpler since the servers do not need to
compute any ciphertext. We thus construct exactly the same security games, except that, when receiving
an Execute or a Send(G, j,m) query from the adversary, we only have to compute the hashing keys and
send the projected keys on behalf of the servers, since they do not need to compute any ciphertext (CDBU is
public). The simulation of the client remains the same. Overall, the advantage of the adversary is bounded
by qs/N , with qs being the number of Send-queries (i.e. on-line dictionary attacks) and N the size of the
dictionary.
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